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THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF RESIGN-TO-
RUN STATUTES: MORIAL V. JUDICIARY
COMMISSION OF LOUISIANA
INTRODUCTION
Founded on the notion that it is desirable to remove the judici-
ary from partisan politics,I statutes requiring that a judge resign his
post before running for nonjudicial political office have been
adopted by a majority of the states.2 Although the need to maintain
judicial integrity is significant,3 the constitutionality of the resul-
tant intrusion on protected freedoms of voters and potential candi-
In discussing the need for resign-to-run statutes, the American Bar Association Re-
porter for the Code of Judicial Conduct notes that "[b]y being a judge or a candidate for
judicial office, a person does not surrender his rights as a citizen; nevertheless, the fundamen-
tal need for impartiality and the appearance of impartiality of judges dictates that limits be
placed on the political conduct of judges and candidates for judicial office." E. THODE,
REPORTER'S NOTES To CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 95 (1973).
In Mahoning County Bar Ass'n v. Franko, 168 Ohio St. 17, 151 N.E.2d 17 (1958), cert.
denied, 358 U.S. 932 (1959), the court stated that the restrictions contained in Ohio's resign-
to-run statute are "not merely arbitrary rules of conduct.. .but are requirements bottomed
on the premise that the judiciary. . shall be kept as far as possible from the 'mainsteam'
of partisan politics. . . ." 168 Ohio St. at 24, 151 N.E.2d at 25. The court noted the impor-
tance of maintaining this separation to avoid even the "suspicion" of politics intruding into
judicial decisions. Id.; accord, In re Gaulkin, 69 N.J. 185, 191, 351 A.2d 740, 743 (1976);
Prescott v. Ferris, 251 App. Div. 113, 119, 295 N.Y.S. 818, 826 (1937); Weinberger v. Miller,
87 Ohio St. 12, 17, 99 N.E. 1078, 1085 (1912); cf. In re Pagliughi, 39 N.J. 517, 523, 189 A.2d
218, 221 (1963) (activities of judges are restricted). See generally Rifkind, A Judge's Nonjudi-
cial Behavior, 38 N.Y.S.B.J. 22 (1966). Judge Rifkind points out that, in addition to the
adverse effects electioneering would have on the impartiality and independence of the judici-
ary, use of the "power or prestige" of the judicial office would be "unfair to the other candi-
dates." Id. at 24.
2 Morial v. Judiciary Comm'n, 565 F.2d 295, 307 app. (5th Cir. 1977) (en banc), cert.
denied, 435 U.S. 1013 (1978); see, e.g., ALASKA STAT., RULES OF COURT PROCEDURE AND
ADMINISTRATION, Canons of Judicial Ethics, Canon 30 (1968); COLO. REv. STAT., CODE OF
JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 7A(2) (1973); DEL. CODE ANN., CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon
7B (1974 & Supp. 1978); NEV. REV. STAT., CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 7A(2) (1977);
N.Y. Ju. LAW, CODE OF JUDICIL CONDUCT app., Canon 7A(3) (McKinney 1975); R.I. GEN.
LAWS, CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS, Canon 27A (1976). Unlike most other jurisdictions, Califor-
nia merely requires judges to take a temporary leave of absence during their nonjudicial
candidacy. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 17.
3 A justification offered for allowing such restrictions to be placed on the political candi-
dacy of judges is that the state has a significant interest in eliminating even the appearance
of judicial impropriety. E. THODE, supra note 1, at 95; see Magill v. Lynch, 560 F.2d 22 (1st
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1063 (1978); In re Schamel, 46 App. Div. 2d 236, 362
N.Y.S.2d 39 (1974) (per curiam), appeal dismissed, 36 N.Y.2d 713, 366 N.Y.S.2d 1029 (1975);
In re Furey, 17 App. Div. 2d 983, 234 N.Y.S.2d 174 (1962) (mem.). See generally Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter
Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973).
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dates has been questioned.' The United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit recently considered this issue in Morial v. Judici-
ary Commission of Louisiana' and held that Louisiana's resign-to-
run rule is consistent with the first amendment rights of free speech
and association and the guarantee of equal protection under the
laws. Emphasizing the unique status accorded judges in our system
of government and the possibilities for abuse of the judicial office,
the court viewed the statute to be a reasorkable exercise of legislative
power.' In light of the competing interests that come into play when
judges seek to run for nonjudicial office in the face of a legislative
prohibition that seeks to preserve a nonpartisan judiciary, an analy-
sis of this decision and the constitutionality of resign-to-run statutes
in general seems warranted. "
MORIAL V. JUDICIARY COMMISSION OF LOUISIANA
Ernest Morial, a Louisiana state court judge, wished to pursue
a campaign for the mayoralty of New Orleans.8 A Louisiana statute9
I See, e.g., Magill v. Lynch, 560 F.2d 22 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1063
(1978); Mancuso v. Taft, 476 F.2d 187 (1st Cir. 1973); Barry v. District of Columbia Bd. of
Elections & Ethics, 448 F. Supp. 1249 (D.D.C. 1978); Alex v. County of Los Angeles, 35 Cal.
App. 3d 994, 111 Cal. Rptr. 285 (1973); Louthan v. Commonwealth, 79 Va. 196 (1884). See
also Perry v. St. Pierre, 518 F.2d 184 (2d Cir. 1975).
Resign-to-run statutes also have been challenged on the ground that they impose a
requirement not authorized by the Constitution on the ability to run for Congress. The
Constitution mandates that a candidate for congressional office be at least 25 years old, a
United States citizen for at least seven years and, at the time of the election, a citizen of the
state he is to represent. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2. It has been argued that these require-
ments are exclusive and that states may neither eliminate nor add requirements. Stack v.
Adams, 315 F. Supp. 1295, 1297 (N.D. Fla. 1970) (per curiam).
In Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974), the Supreme Court had the opportunity to
examine the constitutionality of an additional requirement imposed by a state on congres-
sional candidates. In Storer, the Court upheld California's requirement of party disaffiliation
before an individual may obtain a position on the ballot as an independent candidate. Id. at
728. In upholding the rule, the Court simply found that "the State of California was not
prohibited by the United States Constitution from enforcing that provision against these
men." Id. In Alex v. County of Los Angeles, 35 Cal. App. 3d 994, 111 Cal. Rptr. 285 (1973),
the California Court of Appeals considered this issue and found that a forced leave of absence
without pay for judges seeking election to Congress did not violate the Constitution. Holding
that the California Constitution did "not add a fourth eligibility requirement to run for
Congress," id. at 1007, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 293, the court found these provisions to be mere
conditions or limitations, which did not create barriers to candidacy. Id., 111 Cal. Rptr. at
294.
565 F.2d 295 (5th Cir. 1977) (en banc), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1013 (1978).
8 565 F.2d at 307.
Id. at 302-03.
Id. at 297.
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42:39 (West Supp. 1979). Section 42:39 provides that no judge
except a justice of the peace may qualify as a candidate for nonjudicial office unless he resigns
at least 24 hours before the qualifying date.
1979] RESIGN-TO-RUN STATUTES
and a provision of its code of judicial conduct,10 however, required
judges to resign their positions on the bench prior to running for any
nonjudicial political office. After the Louisiana Supreme Court de-
nied his request for a leave of absence," Judge Morial and thirteen
citizen-voters brought suit in federal district court to enjoin enforce-
ment of the resign-to-run rule. 2 Granting relief, the district court
found that the rule created "a 'chilling' and inhibitory effect" upon
the plaintiffs' free exercise of speech and association in violation of
the first and fourteenth amendments. 3
On appeal, the fifth circuit sitting en banc reversed. 4 Taking
guidance from the Hatch Act cases, wherein the Supreme Court
upheld restrictions placed upon the political activities of civil ser-
vice employees, 5 the Morial court characterized the proper analysis
10 LA. REv. STAT. ANN., CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 7A(3) (West Supp. 1979).
Canon 7A was modeled after 7A of the ABA Code of Judicial Conduct. The American Bar
Association's canon provides in pertinent part that "[a] judge should resign his office when
he becomes a candidate either in a party primary or in a general election for a non-judicial
office. . . ." ABA CANONS OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT No. 7A(3). Canon 7A(3) initially was pro-
posed by the ABA's Committee on Professional Ethics and Grievances and provided that
"[wJhile holding judicial office [a judge] should decline nomination to any other place
which might reasonably tend to create a suspicion or criticism that the proper performance
of his judicial duties is prejudiced or prevented thereby." ABA CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS
No. 30 (1924). This version was criticized on the ground that it "left it to somebody to
determine whether suspicion would point to [the judge]." REPORT OF THE 56TH ANNUAL
MEEING OF THE ABA 179 (1933). The present wording of the canon assumes that "suspicion
is likely to point to [the judge]," and it therefore requires that the judge resign prior to
becoming a nonjudicial candidate. Id.
1 565 F.2d at 297. In a subsequent exchange of letters, the Supreme Court's Committee
on Judicial Ethics informed Judge Morial that preliminary surveys were permissible to deter-
mine the extent of voter and financial support. Id. at 301.
22 Id. at 297.
" Morial v. Judiciary Comm'n, 438 F. Supp. 599, 608 (E.D. La.), rev'd en banc, 565 F.2d
295 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1013 (1978). Terming Louisiana's interest in avoid-
ing the appearance of impropriety as well as averting actual impropriety on the part of its
judiciary "compelling," the district court nevertheless found the state's means to be
"imprecise, .... ineffective" and "far too broad." 438 F. Supp. at 611. The Louisiana statute
and the canon were found to burden significantly and substantially the fundamental rights
of all the plaintiffs. Id. at 610. Since becoming a candidate is one way in which to implement
first amendment freedoms, the statute and canon inhibited Judge Morial's constitutional
rights. Id. at 608, 610. The citizen-voters' right to vote and their first amendment right to
freedom of association were infringed because they were restricted in supporting the candi-
date of their choice. Id. at 610. Thus, the district court granted a preliminary injunction
barring Louisiana's enforcement of the statute. Id. at 612-13. The court reasoned that, with-
out immediate injunctive relief, the citizen-voters would suffer irreparable harm and candi-
date Morial would be placed at a severe disadvantage in the campaign. Id.
" 565 F.2d at 296.
"See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973); United States Civil Serv. Comm'n
v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973); notes 75-90 & accompanying text
infra. See generally United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
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to be employed in reviewing the rule as a "means-end" test.'6 Under
this approach, as the burden on first amendment freedoms in-
creases, the level of scrutiny appreciates accordingly.'7 With this
framework in mind, the Morial court undertook a careful examina-
tion of the interests of Morial, the voters and the state that were
implicated in the enforcement of the resign-to-run statute and
canon.'8
Although the court noted that Morial had a substantial interest
in being permitted to run for political office, it observed that the
Louisiana rule did not impinge on other "core first amendment
values."' 9 In support of this conclusion, the court pointed out that
judges in Louisiana may freely vote for any candidate and express
private opinions concerning political issues outside of the context of
," 565 F.2d at 299-300. The fifth circuit considered several threshold questions prior to
reaching the merits of the case. It initially determined that, although Judge Morial eventually
resigned his judgeship and was elected Mayor of New Orleans, the case was not moot since
"[sluits challenging the validity of state election laws are classic examples of cases in which
the issues are 'capable of repetition, yet evading review.' "Id. at 297-98 n.3 (citing American
Party v. White, 415 U.S. 767, 770 n.1 (1974); Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 737 n.8 (1974);
Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814, 816 (1969)). The Morial court noted that in none of the leading
Supreme Court decisions had the suit been brought as a class action. 565 F.2d at 297-98 n.3;
see Mandel v. Bradley, 432 U.S. 173 (1977) (per curiam). See also Magill v. Lynch, 560 F.2d
22, 25 n.1 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1063 (1978). The fifth circuit also rejected
the argument that the case should have been dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
in that it did not present a real case or controversy. 565 F.2d at 298-99. The court reasoned
that, although Morial had yet to violate the law, his future conduct was sufficiently ar that
Louisiana authorities could "determine that [this] conduct would. . . expose him to sanc-
tions." Id. Thus, "the threat of punishment. . . [could not] be characterized as 'imaginary
or speculative.' "Id. at 299. Finally, the court found that it was not precluded by principles
of federalism and comity from entertaining questions of state judicial administration. Id.
'1 565 F.2d at 299-300. The court rejected characterizing the type of analysis to be em-
ployed as a "balancing approach." Id. at 299; see Magill v. Lynch, 560 F.2d 22, 27 (1st Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1063 (1978); Alderman v. Philadelphia Hous. Auth., 496 F.2d
164, 171 n.45 (3d Cir. 1974). Although the court noted that "the means-end fit" need not be
perfect, the inquiry would require a "closeness of fit between [the] governmental interests"
involved and the means used to effectuate them. 565 F.2d at 300. More specifically, since the
resign-to-run statute imposed a prohibition on a non-speech activity, the court adopted a test
whereby the restraint would be upheld if it was "justified by a reasonable necessity to burden
those activities to achieve a compelling public objective." Id. at 300 (citation omitted). The
Morial court admitted that its view of the proper constitutional analysis to be used had "not
[been] articulated . . .in precisely this way" by the Supreme Court. Id. at n.5.
' See 565 F.2d at 301-03.
ig Id. at 301. The Morial court noted that "[r]elegating one's robes to the closet is a
heavy price to pay for tossing one's hat in the ring" and found that a burden upon the ability
to run for office substantially affects freedom of political expression. Id. See also Mancuso v.
Taft, 476 F.2d 187, 195 (1st Cir. 1973); People's Party v. Tucker, 347 F. Supp. 1, 3 (M.D. Pa.
1972); Zeilenga v. Nelson, 4 Cal. 3d 716, 720, 484 P.2d 578, 580, 94 Cal. Rptr. 602, 604 (1971)
(en banc). On the other hand, the court observed that candidacy is not a fundamental right.
565 F.2d at 301 (citing Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 143 (1972)); see notes 54-61 and
accompanying text infra.
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a political campaign. 20 These unabridged rights were found to miti-
gate the impairment of first amendment freedoms caused Bby restric-
tions on the right to candidacy.2' With respect to the rule's impact
upon the plaintiff-voters, the court termed the burden inflicted by
the statute "less substantial. 2 2 While the attractive qualities of
Louisiana judges as candidates for nonjudicial office was acknowl-
edged, the court found that their exclusion from the pool of prospec-
tive office-seekers did not significantly reduce the availability of
candidates to represent particular viewpoints.23
Concluding its analysis of the interests of Morial and the voters,
the court determined that strict constitutional scrutiny would be
inappropriate.Y Instead, the proper inquiry was found to be whether
the state had demonstrated a "reasonable necessity" for imposing
the resignation requirement.2s
In determining the reasonable necessity for burdening the
plaintiffs' rights with a resign-to-run rule, the court identified the
interest of Louisiana in "assuring the impartiality of judicial admin-
istration" as "grave and honorable. '2 Viewed in this way, the re-
quirement of resignation made a "substantial contribution" to the
goal of avoiding the appearance of impropriety during and after
nonjudicial political campaigns.Y Thus, the first amendment chal-
21 565 F.2d at 301.
21 Id.
22 Id.
2 Id. at 302. The court stated that, where restrictions on candidacy had been struck down
by the Supreme Court, it was because an "identifiable group or viewpoint" was being ex-
cluded. Id.; see Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709 (1974); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972);
Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346 (1970); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968). The Morial
court contrasted those situations with the facts before it:
While we would be the last to deny that Louisiana state judges have qualities of
talent and experience which make them attractive candidates for non-judicial of-
fice, excluding the class of judges cannot be said to have a major impact upon the
availability of candidates to represent any particular group or viewpoint. Exclusion
of judges from the pool of prospective candidates cannot be supposed to have a
qualitatively different effect on the interests of voters than the analogous exclusion
of equally talented and experienced federal and state civil servants, an exclusion
which the Supreme Court found constitutional in [the Hatch Act cases].
565 F.2d at 302; see notes 75-90 and accompanying text infra.
24 565 F.2d at 302.
2 Id.; see note 17 supra.
21 565 F.2d at 302; see United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter
Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973). Specifically, the resign-to-run rule was understood to advance
the interests of Louisiana in preventing abuse of the judicial office by a judge during a
political campaign, preventing abuse by a judge returning to his former position after a
defeat, and avoiding the appearance of impropriety during and after the political campaign.
565 F.2d at 302.
2 565 F.2d at 303. The Morial court reasoned that "[h]e who does not hold the powers
1979]
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lenge to the statute was rejected.28
With respect to the plaintiffs' equal protection argument, the
court noted that the rule created two classifications.29 First, while
judges planning to run for nonjudicial office were required to resign,
there was no proscription on judges seeking other judicial posi-
tions.3 In addition, only judges had to resign from office when run-
ning for a nonjudicial position. 31 Although the district court found
no rational basis for distinguishing between elections for judicial
and nonjudicial office, 32 the fifth circuit found sufficient differences
of the office cannot abuse them or even be thought to abuse them." Id. The court found that
whatever alternate means existed to effectuate the state's interests would not provide the
same measure of protection as the requirement of resignation. Id. It was noted, for example,
that while a leave of absence may be useful in preventing abuse of the judicial position during
a campaign, it would not prevent abuses by the judge following a losing campaign. Id. In
addition, while disciplinary proceedings may be useful in individual cases, the court found
that the state did not have to rely on such limited sanctions when seeking to preserve the
integrity of the judicial system. Id. The plaintiffs argued that Louisiana had disavowed these
interests by providing for an elected judiciary whereby judges bearing party endorsements
were intimately involved in the partisan political process. Id. at 302-03 n.6. Although the
court stated that this issue was best analyzed in an equal protection context, it "reject[ed]
the implied premise of [this] argument, i.e., that unless the state exercis[ed] the full extent
of its power to prevent some evil, the state's interest in preventing that evil [could not] be
considered constitutionally weighty." Id.
2' Id. at 303. It was acknowledged by the court that Judge Morial intended to run as an
independent candidate. Id. at n.8. Recognizing the "restrictive language of Letter Car-
riers," which apparently limited the holding to partisan political activity, the Morial court
nevertheless stated that this did not require "courts to ignore the reality of partisanship if
the formality of party affiliation [was] absent." Id. The court noted that "[a] faction may
form around a man as much as around a party label; the judicial office may be abused by
using it to promote the interest of a faction as well as a formal party." Id. at 303-04 n.8.
In United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548
(1973), the Supreme Court stated that "plainly identifiable acts of political management and
political campaigning on the part of federal employees may constitutionally be prohibited."
Id. at 567. This specific language was relied upon in Smith v. Ehrlich, 430 F. Supp. 818
(D.D.C. 1976), wherein the court upheld the constitutionality of a statute prohibiting partisan
and nonpartisan political involvement by attorneys employed in the state's legal services
agencies. Recognizing that the power to regulate partisan political activities of government
employees was clearly upheld by the Supreme Court, the Smith court found no "intimation
that Congress was limited to controlling only partisan behaviour [sic]. In fact the Letter
Carriers decision rather unequivocally reach[ed] the opposite conclusion." Id. at 820-21;
accord, Magill v. Lynch, 560 F.2d 22 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1063 (1978). In
interpreting Letter Carriers, the Magill court believed that when ostensibly nonpartisan
elections are involved, the government still may restrict the constitutional rights of its em-
ployees if "political parties play[ed] a large role in the campaigns." 560 F.2d at 29.
565 F.2d at 304.
30 Id.
31 Id.
1 Id. The district court found that judicial and nonjudicial campaigns were similar
because in both types of campaigns money is raised, speeches and promises are made and
candidates attempt to appeal to diverse groups. 438 F. Supp. at 605.
1979] RESIGN-TO-RUN STATUTES
between the judiciary and other governmental bodies to justify the
distinctive treatment.3
While the Morial decision addressed only the constitutionality
of the Louisiana resign-to-run statute, it is likely that the opinion
will be influential in judicial determinations regarding similar stat-
utes in other jurisdictions. It therefore seems worthwhile to assess
the soundness of the decision.
THE "REASONABLE NECESsrrY" TEST AND RESIGN-TO-RUN STATUTES
Challenges to resign-to-run statutes typically focus on the re-
strictions such laws place on activities protected by the first amend-
ment.34 Since these laws direct themselves to a specific part of the
populace, they are also susceptible to attack on equal protection
grounds.3 5 When confronted with first and fourteenth amendment
m 565 F.2d at 305. The Morial court referred to the fact that the judiciary is treated
separately in the state constitution. Id. Furthermore, contrary to the findings made by the
district court, campaign activities on the part of the judicial office-seekers were viewed to be
different from those of people seeking election to other public offices. Id.
Recognizing that the "case [was] a difficult one" and that his "voice [was] a lonely
one," Judge Fay dissented. 565 F.2d at 310 (Fay, J., dissenting). Noting that first amendment
jurisprudence is in "flux," and that "reconciling the plethora of cases. . .. is near to impossi-
ble," Judge Fay accepted the "reasonable necessity" standard adopted by the majority. Id.
at 308 (Fay, J., dissenting).'Since the district court made a finding of fact that judicial and
nonjudicial campaigns are similar, see note 32 supra, the dissent thought the classifications
created by the statute were constitutionally impermissible. 565 F.2d at 309 (Fay, J., dis-
senting). Judge Fay, however, did see merit in resign-to-run statutes that are applied to all
office holders. Id. at 309-10 (Fay, J., dissenting).
3 Resign-to-run statutes infringe on the freedoms of expression and association and the
right to political candidacy. These freedoms, however, are not absolute. Elrod v. Bums, 427
U.S. 347, 360 (1976); see United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter
Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 567 (1973); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963); United Pub.
Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 95 (1947).
3 Under traditional equal protection analysis, a two-tier approach is employed. Where
no suspect class or fundamental right is involved, "minimal scrutiny" is used and it requires
that legislation be rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest. E.g., Weber v.
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 172 (1972); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 71 (1968);
F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920). Such laws are presumed to be
valid. See, e.g., Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 314 (1976); Weber
v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 172 (1972); McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs,
394 U.S. 802, 809 (1969); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961). This low level
of constitutional scrutiny generally permits legislatures to deal with complex issues as they
see fit, considering reforms "one step at a time," rather than attacking an entire problem at
once. Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955); see Dandridge v. Williams, 397
U.S. 471, 485 (1970); McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802, 809 (1969). The
legislation is only found unconstitutional when it is totally arbitrary and unrelated to its goal.
See, e.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970); McDonald v. Board of Election
Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802, 809 (1969); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961); Alex v.
County of Los Angeles, 35 Cal. App. 3d 994, 1000, 111 Cal. Rptr. 285, 289 (1973).
When a suspect class or fundamental constitutional right is involved, "strict scrutiny"
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claims, it is usual for courts to apply the same standard of constitu-
tional scrutiny." In evaluating restraints placed on political activity
by a state, the courts seek to determine how the limitations on
individual freedoms advance governmental interests.37 The means
employed to achieve the state's interests will be upheld if they relate
directly to the interests involved and have been so narrowly con-
ceived as to have the least impact possible on protected rights .3
This "means-end" or "balancing" approach is not used, however,
is the appropriate standard of review. See notes 39-41 and accompanying text infra. A suspect
classification is one that is invidious and arbitrary on its face. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia,
388 U.S. 1 (1967) (race); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (nationality).
In recent years, traditional equal protection analysis has given way to a standard of
review which varies according to such factors as the importance of the governmental interest,
the individual interests being burdened and the means used by the government to effectuate
its interest in comparison to the possible alternatives. This new test is more means-oriented.
By focusing attention on the means and its closeness to the interests sought, the hope is that
this test will avoid the categorization of the traditional equal protection tests and thus be
less result-oriented. See Gunther, Foreward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing
Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. Rv. 1 (1972); Yarbrough, The
Burger Court and Unspecified Rights: On Protecting Fundamental and Not-so-Fundamental
"Rights" or "Interests" Through a Flexible Conception of Equal Protection, 1977 DUKE L.J.
143. See also Note, Equal Protection: Modes of Analysis in the Burger Court, 53 DEN. L.J.
687 (1976).
11 See, e.g., 565 F.2d at 304. "[Elvery first amendment claim can be transformed into
an equal protection claim merely by focusing upon the classification that every legislative
scheme embodies." Id.
37 Although judicial scrutiny in the first amendment area is usually termed a
"balancing" process, the Supreme Court has stated that first amendment freedoms are not
actually balanced against governmental interests. United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 268
n.20 (1967). The Court reasoned that it is "inappropriate for [the] Court to label one
[interest] as being more important or more substantial than the other." Id. Endorsing a
"means-end" analysis, the Court quoted Chief Justice Marshall: "'Let the end be legitimate,
let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are
plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consistent with the letter and spirit
of the constitution, are constitutional.' " Id. (quoting M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819)). Nonetheless, it is common for courts to refer to the proper method
of scrutiny as being a balancing approach. See, e.g., Magill v. Lynch, 560 F.2d 22 (1st Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1063 (1978); McNea v. Garey, 434 F. Supp. 95 (N.D. Ohio 1976).
In Magill, the court stated that it could not "be more precise than . . . [to characterize]
the Court's approach as 'some sort of "balancing" process.' " 560 F.2d at 27 (citations omit-
ted).
, United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968); United States v. Robel, 389 U.S.
258, 267, 268 n.20 (1967); Gasparinetti v. Kerr, 568 F.2d 311, 316 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
436 U.S. 903 (1978); Kucinich v. Forbes, 432 F. Supp. 1101, 1111 (N.D. Ohio 1977). As the
infringement on basic first amendment freedoms becomes greater, the corresponding govern-
mental interest must approach the level of "compelling." See Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347,
362 (1976); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25 (1976); Mancuso v. Taft, 476 F.2d 187, 196 (1st
Cir. 1973); DeStefano v. Wilson, 96 N.J. Super. 592, 598-99, 233 A.2d 682, 685 (Super. Ct.
1967). See also Johnson v. State Civil Serv. Dep't, 280 Minn. 61, 157 N.W.2d 747 (1968);
Minielly v. State, 242 Or. 490, 411 P.2d 69 (1966).
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when a fundamental right is burdened. 9 In such circumstances,
strict scrutiny is the applicable standard of review9 and the onus is
placed upon the government to show that the law furthers a compel-
ling interest, that it is closely related to the achievement of that
interest and that less burdensome means are not available."
To date, the Supreme Court has not declared political candi-
dacy a fundamental right. There is, however, both historical and
case law precedent arguing in favor of the recognition of this right
as fundamental. The debates surrounding the adoption of the Con-
stitution in 1787 are replete with references to the need for the
electoral process to be free from legislative intrusion.2 Discussion
involved not only the issue of franchise, but also the extent to which
there should be limitations placed on those seeking election.13 Addi-
31 Fundamental rights may derive from express provisions of the Constitution or may be
implicit therein. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (right to privacy); Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (right to travel); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S.
663 (1966) (right to vote); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (right to privacy). In
recent years, the Supreme Court has been more reluctant to recognize fundamental rights.
See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (right to educa-
tion); Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972) (right to governmental employment).
10 Under the Warren Court, the traditional two-tier test was criticized as being too result-
oriented. That is, once the decision was made that a suspect class or fundamental right was
involved, the challenged law generally would be struck down. On the other hand, when a
rational basis test was found to be appropriate, the law was almost always upheld. See Bice,
Standards of Judicial Review Under the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses, 50 S.
CAL. L. REv. 689 (1977). In Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976),
Justice Marshall observed that "[i]f a statute invades a 'fundamental' right or discriminates
against a 'suspect' class, it is subject to strict scrutiny . . . [and] nearly always is struck
down. . . . [Tihe only critical decision is whether strict scrutiny should be invoked at all."
Id. at 319 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citations omitted); see Alevy v. Downstate Medical
Center, 39 N.Y.2d 326, 348 N.E.2d 537, 384 N.Y.S.2d 82 (1976). The Burger Court has taken
a different approach and has struck down statutes using the minimal level of scrutiny. See,
e.g., Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975); Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972); James
v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128 (1972); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972); Reed
v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971); note 35 supra. Minimal scrutiny under the Burger Court, there-
fore, "is not a toothless [standard]" nor one that predetermines the outcome of the decision.
Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 510 (1976). The Burger Court continues to utilize the
language of two-tier analysis, but its decisions indicate a trend toward the same "balancing"
or "means-end" test used in first amendment analysis.
" See, e.g., Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 172 (1972); Dunn v. Blum-
stein, 405 U.S. 330, 335-36 (1972); Alex v. County of Los Angeles, 35 Cal. App. 3d 994, 1000-
01, 111 Cal. Rptr. 285, 289 (1973); Barrett, Judicial Supervision of Legislative Classifications
- A More Modest Role for Equal Protection?, 1976 B.Y.U.L. Rav. 89; Bice, supra note 40, at
689.
12 See Gordon, The Constitutional Right to Candidacy, 25 U. KA. L. REv. 545, 546-48
(1977).
" See id. The framers of the Constitution feared that limitations placed on the right to
vote and qualifications placed on the ability to become a candidate by state legislatures would
destroy the republican form of government. James Madison, for example, stated that "[the
qualifications of electors and elected were fundamental articles in a Republican
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tionally, the debates on the passage of the fifteenth amendment,
although inconclusive, indicate that the right to hold office was
understood to be distinct from the right to vote and thus in need of
specific protection. 44 In recent years, various state and lower federal
courts have acknowledged the existence of a fundamental right to
candidacy. 45 Notwithstanding the absence of a clear conceptual
footing upon which to base this right, it appears that since political
expression and voting are consistently found to be protected activi-
ties, candidacy is viewed to deserve constitutional protection as an
inherent part of the political process. 6
Proponents of the recognition of a fundamental right of candi-
dacy found support for their position in Williams v. Rhodes,47 de-
cided by the Supreme Court in 1968. Williams involved a challenge
to the validity of Ohio's election law which required political parties
to obtain petitions containing a specified number of signatures of
qualified voters before the party's candidates could be placed on the
ballot in the 1968 presidential election. 48 The effect of this law was
to exclude new and minor parties and independent candidates from
[government] and ought to be fixed by the Constitution. If the Legislature could regulate
those of either, it [could] by degrees subvert the Constitution." 2 M. FARRAND, RECORDS OF
THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 249-50 (lst ed. 1911), quoted in Gordon, supra note 42, at
547.
" Gordon, supra note 42, at 548-50. Ms. Gordon states that the rights to vote and hold
office were regarded by the framers of our Constitution as "crucial to the success of their new
scheme of government, and. . . the Reconstruction Congress regarded them as indispensable
to the security of political freedom for the emancipated slaves." Id. at 550. Despite these early
indications that political candidacy was considered to be a fundamental freedom, however,
"the extent to which the right to hold office was specifically meant to be defined and pro-
tected in the constitutional plan" remained "inconclusive." Id.
11 See, e.g., McKinney v. Kaminsky, 340 F. Supp. 289, 294 (M.D. Ala. 1972); White v.
Snear, 313 F. Supp. 1100, 1103 (E.D. Pa. 1970); Zeilenga v. Nelson, 4 Cal. 3d 716, 720, 484
P.2d 578, 580, 94 Cal. Rptr. 602, 604 (1971) (en banc); Cowan v. City of Aspen, 181 Colo. 343,
509 P.2d 1269, 1272 (1973) (en banc). The rationale offered to justify recognition of a funda-
mental right to candidacy tends to be couched in broad terms. See, e.g., Mancuso v. Taft,
476 F.2d 187 (1st Cir. 1973) (candidacy is protected fundamental interest); McKinney v.
Kaminsky, 340 F. Supp. 289 (M.D. Ala. 1972) (right to seek office protected by federal
constitution); Zeilenga v. Nelson, 4 Cal. 3d 716, 484 P.2d 578, 94 Cal. Rptr. 602 (1971) (en
banc) (right to hold office is fundamental right); Cowan v. City of Aspen, 181 Colo. 343, 509
P.2d 1269 (1973) (en banc) (right to hold office fundamental right of citizenship).
46 See Gordon, supra note 42, at 562-69. A footnote in United States v. Carolene Prods.
Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938), was seen as "a caveat that the Court's standards of
review might vary depending on the kind of legislation challenged." Gordon, supra note 42,
at 563 (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original). Ms. Gordon reasons that certain language
in Carolene Products places "candidacy on an equal basis with voting, although not as a right
derived from the right to vote, and, therefore, as a fundamental right for no other reason than
its connection with the political processes." Id. at 564 (emphasis in original).
393 U.S. 23 (1968).
Id. at 24-25.
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the ballot, while giving the two established political parties a mo-
nopoly." Stating that there was no compelling interest justifying the
significant burden placed on the right to vote for the candidate of
one's choice, the Court sustained the plaintiffs' equal protection
claims." In reaching this conclusion, the Court referred to the "right
. . .to cast [one's] vote effectively" as one of "our most precious
freedoms."51 The decision of the Williams Court was interpreted by
some as an endorsement of the idea that there is a fundamental
right to candidacy.- Emphasizing the ultimate implications of the
right to vote effectively, it was reasoned that any regulations re-
straining the right of candidates to gain access to the ballot should
be subjected to strict scrutiny. 3 Whatever appeal this logic may
have had for political purists, however, the Supreme Court later
declined to adopt such a view. In Bullock v. Carter,5' the Court
struck down a Texas law requiring that large filing fees be paid by
candidates seeking access to the primary ballot. 5 Giving close scru-
tiny to the state's argument that the fee requirement was necessary
to regulate the size of the ballot and finance the primary election,
' Id. at 25.
Id. at 30. Discussing the importance of the right to vote, the Court stated that" '[n]o
right is more precious in a free country than that of having a voice in the election of those
who make the laws under which. . . we must live. Other rights, even the most basic, are
illusory if the right to vote is undermined.' "Id. at 31 (quoting Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S.
1, 17 (1964)).
5, 393 U.S. at 31 (emphasis added). Ohio had contended that in the interest of fostering
political stability, it could validly promote a two-party system. The Court rejected this
argument, however, finding Ohio's system to "[favor] two particular parties . .. and in
effect [tend] to give them a complete monopoly." Id. at 32. The state also believed its system
ensured that people who disagreed with the two major parties would have an opportunity to
express their preferences on leadership and issues. While this was a "laudable goal," the
Court reasoned that the Ohio system could not achieve this purpose because its "burdensome
procedures . . . operat[ed] to prevent such [groups] from ever getting on the ballot...
thus [denying] the 'disaffected' not only a choice of leadership but a choice on the issues as
well." Id. at 33.
52 See, e.g., Note, Durational Residence Requirements for State and Local Office: A
Violation of Equal Protection?, 45 S. CAL. L. Rmv. 996, 1009 (1972); Comment, Durational
Residence Requirements for Candidates, 40 U. Cmu. L. Rav. 357, 369 (1973); Comment, Equal
Protection and Property Qualifications for Elective Office, 118 U. PA. L. Rv. 129, 137-39
(1969). One commentator has stated that "free access to public office" is important because
"[tihe promise of democracy is that today's minorities, through rational persuasion and
political maneuvering, can become tomorrow's majority. The promise is dashed if today's
majority biases the structure of governmental institutions in favor of its own self-
perpetuation." Id. at 139 (footnotes omitted).
5 See, e.g., Mancuso v. Taft, 476 F.2d 187 (1st Cir. 1973); McKinney v. Kaminsky, 340
F. Supp. 289 (M.D. Ala. 1972); Cowan v. City of Aspen, 181 Colo. 343, 509 P.2d 1269 (1973)
(en banc). See generally Gordon, supra note 42.
5' 405 U.S. 134 (1972).
Id. at 149.
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the Court described its inquiry as an examination "in a realistic
light [of] the extent and nature of [the law's] impact on voters." 6
Although the Bullock Court acknowledged that "the rights of voters
and the rights of candidates do not lend themselves to neat separa-
tion," it observed that candidacy is not accorded the status of a
fundamental right. 57 In addition to confirming the notion that not
all burdens on the exercise of the right to vote should be subject to
strict scrutiny, 58 the Court analyzed the constitutionality of the stat-
ute in terms of whether it was "reasonably necessary to the accom-
plishment of legitimate state objectives."59
Bullock, and the Hatch Act cases that were to follow,6 indicate
that if strict scrutiny is to be given to restrictions on the right to run
for office, it is for some other reason than that candidacy is a funda-
mental right. Thus, a justification for employing a strict scrutiny
approach to invalidate certain election laws sometimes has been
based upon an appreciation of the interrelationship between restric-
tions placed on candidacy and the resulting impact on the funda-
mental right to vote. Where voters' rights are impaired by strictures
placed on political candidacy, this approach considers the extent
and nature of the infringement.' A case-by-case approach finds
6 Id. at 143-45.
Id. at 142-43. Most courts today recognize that candidacy is not a fundamental right.
See, e.g., Antonio v. Kirkpatrick, 579 F.2d 1147, 1149 (8th Cir. 1978); Plante v. Gonzalez,
575 F.2d 1119, 1126 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 99 S.Ct. 1047 (1979); Newcomb v. Brennan,
558 F.2d 825, 828 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 968 (1977); Blassman v. Markworth, 359
F. Supp. 1, 6 (N.D. Ill. 1973); Bolanowski v. Raich, 330 F. Supp. 724, 731 (E.D. Mich. 1971).
As recently as 1973, the first circuit held that candidacy is a fundamental right. Mancuso v.
Taft, 476 F.2d 187, 196 (1st Cir. 1973). Following the Supreme Court's decision in United
States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973), however,
the first ciruit changed its view. In Magill v. Lynch, 560 F.2d 22 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 1063 (1978), the first circuit stated that, based on its interpretation of Letter
Carriers, there was a different governmental interest involved in regulating the conduct of
public employees as opposed to citizens in general. 560 F.2d at 27. Magill involved a suit
brought by public employees. Thus, the court left unanswered whether candidacy might be
a fundamental right for "citizens who are not government employees." Id.
California precedent long held that the right of candidacy was a fundamental right
protected by the first amendment. See Zeilenga v. Nelson, 4 Cal. 3d 716, 720, 484 P.2d 578,
580, 94 Cal. Rptr. 602, 604 (1971) (en banc) (citing Fort v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 61 Cal. 2d
331, 335, 392 P.2d 385, 387, 38 Cal. Rptr. 625, 627 (1964)). But recently, in Bill v. Williams,
70 Cal. App. 3d 531, 139 Cal. Rptr. 19 (1977), a California court of appeals stated that
"candidacy is not viewed as a 'fundamental right' which of itself warrants strict scrutiny.
However, where a practice . . . also has a real and appreciable effect on the right to vote
effectively, that practice is subject to rigorous judicial review." Id. at 535, 139 Cal. Rptr. at
21 (citations omitted).
' 405 U.S. at 143.
' Id. at 144.
" See notes 75-90 and accompanying text infra.
" See, e.g., Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974); Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709 (1974);
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support in the Williams and Bullock rationales, which considered
the ability of individuals to vote effectively. Although it is difficult
precisely to define the appropriate level of scrutiny to be applied, it
seems clear that invalidation of state election laws has typically
occurred where a given limitation placed upon candidacy effects a
direct burden on the ability of a particular portion of the electorate
to vote effectively. 2 In such situations, the government's interests
must be compelling to justify interference with a fundamental right.
Where the infringement on voters' rights is more incidental,
however, fundamental right analysis becomes inappropriate.13 This
was the case in Morial. The consequences of Louisiana's resign-to-
run law did not tend to exclude potential representatives of particu-
lar groups of people or political philosophies. 4 Since the right to run
for office is not fundamental 5 and the statute had only an indirect
impact on the rights of voters, the fifth circuit was free to apply
something less exacting than strict scrutiny. The court's adoption
of a test whereby restrictions on political activity would be upheld
only "if justified by a reasonable necessity . . . to burden those
activities to achieve a compelling public objective" seems appropri-
ate.66 This standard of review gives adequate consideration to the
Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972). See also Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346 (1970); Moore
v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814 (1969); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968). In Bullock, the Court
analyzed the rights of candidates as they affect the fundamental right to vote, because
statutes affecting candidates "always have at least some theoretical, correlative effect on
voters." 405 U.S. at 143. In Lubin, the Court noted the intertwining of candidacy and voting
and stated that "voters can assert their preferences only through candidates or parties or both
and it is this broad interest that must be weighed in the balance." 415 U.S. at 716. In Storer,
the Court made clear that the relationship between candidacy and voting does not mandate
automatic invalidation of every restriction on the right to vote. Instead, the decision is a
"matter of degree" and is based upon the interests of the state and the impact of the restric-
tions upon affected individuals. Id. at 730 (citation omitted). See generally Gordon, supra
note 42. Ms. Gordon observes that
[p]rotection of candidates' rights has been traced through a circuitous route
whereby it is shown that voters' rights are abridged by the impairment of a candi-
date's ability to gain access to the ballot. It has been argued that the right to vote
loses its importance in the absence of a meaningful choice for the voter and, hence,
restrictions on candidates' opportunities to run for office indirectly restrict voters
as well.
Id. at 558 (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original).
6 See, e.g., Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709 (1974); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972);
Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
61 See, e.g., Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972);
Morial v. Judiciary Comm'n, 565 F.2d 295 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1013 (1978).
11 See 565 F.2d at 302.
': See notes 54-57 and accompanying text supra.
" 565 F.2d at 300 (citation and footnote omitted). The Supreme Court has characterized
the nature of the governmental interest that must be shown to justify a restriction on first
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importance of political activity as the "ultimate [form] of political
expression in our society." 7
While the protection accorded first amendment activities under
the reasonable necessity test seems to be of a suitable magnitude,
the application of this standard by the Morial court stands on less
firm ground. While acknowledging that the decision which a judge
is forced to make if he is contemplating running for nonjudicial
office burdens the exercise of an important right,6 8 the court deem-
phasized the impairment of first amendment rights by examining
the interests of judges left untouched by the law's scope." Consider-
ation of the interests left unaffected by the rule, however, appears
irrelevant. When the Supreme Court engaged in this type of analysis
in the Hatch Act cases, it did so in the face of a challenge to the
Act on vagueness and overbreadth grounds. 0 Utilization of this ap-
proach to determine the significance of the intrusion on the free-
doms of expression and association seems questionable when over-
amendment rights in various ways. In United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), the
Court noted that the terms that have been used include "compelling; substantial; subordinat-
ing; paramount; cogent; strong." Id. at 376-77 (footnotes omitted).
11 565 F.2d at 301.
I d.
See id.
See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973); United States Civil Serv. Comm'n
v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973). When legislatures enact laws directly
or incidentally affecting the first amendment freedoms of speech and association, the possibil-
ity exists that those who are not intended to be restricted will be deterred from exercising
their rights. Such a result is recognized to have a "chilling effect" upon first amendment
freedoms. In Hobbs v. Thompson, 448 F.2d 456 (5th Cir. 1971), the court stated that the
overbreadth doctrine is concerned with the situation that exists when the "statutory burden
operates as a disincentive to action and creates an in terrorem effect on conduct within the
protection of the First Amendment." Id. at 459 (emphasis in original). Thus, the overbreadth
doctrine "focuses directly on the need for precision in legislative draftsmanship to avoid
conflict with First Amendment rights." Id. at 460. Substantial or compelling government
interests may allow incidental restrictions 9 f first amendment rights, but "means to that
legitimate end which comprehend too broad an incursion upon the realm of First Amendment
activity" are not to be tolerated. Id. Hobbs concerned a Macon City ordinance prohibiting
firemen from taking an active part in primary or general election campaigns, contributing
money, soliciting votes or identifying themselves with or against any candidate for political
office. Id. at 457. Although the fifth circuit recognized that the Supreme Court had upheld
the validity of Hatch Acts which restricted the activities of public employees, the statute
involved in Hobbs went "far beyond the Hatch Act provisions approved there by the Supreme
Court." Id. at 471. The ordinance was deemed unconstitutional because of its overly broad
restrictions on public employees, restrictions that were unrelated to the performance of duties
by the employees. Id. at 475. Specifically at issue was an employee's display of a bumper
sticker supporting a candidate for the state assembly. The court was of the opinion that this
activity was closer to "personal expression of political opinion," a protected activity, than to
"partisan concerted activity on behalf of a party," activity that the government could validly
regulate. Id. at 472.
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breadth is not alleged and the constitutionality of the statute as
applied is contested.
With respect to Louisiana's interest in ensuring "the actual and
perceived integrity of state judges," the statute was found to be
reasonably necessary. 7' To the extent that forced resignation rids the
appearance of abuse by a sitting judge during an election campaign,
however, a leave of absence would be a less intrusive means to
vindicate the state's interests. In addition, while resignation cer-
tainly prevents the possibility of immediate post-campaign abuses,
there is nothing to prevent a defeated ex-judge from mounting a
subsequent campaign for a judicial office. Although it is true that
the state has a certain degree of latitude in choosing the best means
to avoid the appearance of impropriety,72 the temporary nature of
the resignation requirement brings into question both the reasona-
ble necessity of the statute and its effectiveness. This is also true of
the classifications created under the statute. Permitting judges to
run for other judicial positions, while proscribing campaigns for
nonjudicial office, was justified on the basis of the distinctive nature
of the judicial position.73 The partisan character of nonjudicial
races, where promises of post-campaign conduct are commonplace,
was understood to present a situation where defeated judges could
be accused of acting improperly in the post-campaign period. 74 It is
not unusual for would-be legislators defeated in a bid for elective
office, however, to seek judicial positions. The possibility that these
once-aspiring legislative office-holders could act in a partial man-
ner, or appear to do so, seems just as likely as it does in the case of
defeated judges.
The Morial court's analysis was patterned after the approach
taken by the Supreme Court in the Hatch Act cases. These decisions
upheld the constitutionality of sweeping restrictions on the partisan
political activity of federal and state civil servants. A close examina-
tion of the governmental interests involved in those cases and the
means used to realize them reveals that those decisions involved
issues readily distinguishable from those presented in Morial.
The Supreme Court's initial consideration of the Hatch Act,
United Public Workers v. Mitchell,75 concerned the constitution-
ality of section 9 which prohibits employees of the executive branch
"1 565 F.2d at 302-03.
71 See note 35 supra.
71 565 F.2d at 305-06.
71 Id. at 305.
73 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
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of the federal government from taking an active part in political
campaigns." Balancing the individual freedoms that are circum-
scribed under the Act against the government interest in "orderly
management of administrative personnel," the 'Court upheld the
constitutionality of the Act, finding only a "measure of interfer-
ence" with protected activities. In 1973, United States Civil Serv-
ice Commission v. National Association of Letter Carriers78 and
Broadrick v. Oklahoma" further clarified the basis upon which the
constitutionality of the Act rested. In Letter Carriers, the Court
utilized a "balancing" approach and viewed the Act as "serv[ing
the] great end of Government-the impartial execution of the
laws." 0 In order to realize this interest, the Court reasoned that it
is necessary to permit some restrictions upon the constitutional free-
doms of federal employees.8 1 The Court concluded that "neither the
First Amendment nor any other provision of the Constitution invali-
dates a law barring this kind of political conduct by federal employ-
ees."82 Broadrick applied similar reasoning in reviewing the validity
of a state Hatch Act. While the Court noted that had the state act
76 Id. at 94-104. Section 9(a) of the Hatch Act, 5 U.S.C. § 7324(a) (1976), provides in
pertinent part: "An employee in an Executive agency. . . may not (1) use his official author-
ity or influence for the purpose of interfering with or affecting the result of an election; or (2)
take an active part in political management or in political campaigns."
n 330 U.S. at 94-96. The Court stated that the rights guaranteed by the first, ninth and
tenth amendments of the Constitution "are not absolutes .... [They] are subject to the
elemental need for order without which the guarantees of civil rights to others would be a
mockery." Id. at 95 (footnote omitted). It was added, however, that restrictions on protected
rights must be related to the interest sought to be furthered by the government in enacting
the statute. Thus, "[o]nly while the employee is politically active . . . must he withhold
expression of opinion on public subjects." Id. at 94.
78 413 U.S. 548 (1973).
413 U.S. 601 (1973).
413 U.S. at 565. The Court balanced the interests of federal employees in being free
to speak about "matters of public concern" with the government's interest in "promoting the
efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees." Id. at 564 (quoting
Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968)). The Supreme Court interpreted the
Hatch Act as prohibiting federal employees from taking "formal positions in political parties,
• . . play[ing] substantial roles in partisan political campaigns and . . . run[ning] for
office on partisan political tickets." 413 U.S. at 565. The Court recognized a congressional
intent to prevent the possible creation of "a powerful, invincible, and perhaps corrupt politi-
cal machine" by federal employees left unrestricted in their political activity. Id.
11 413 U.S. at 564. Important to the Court's evaluation and "balancing" of the competing
interests was that the "restrictions . . . [were] not aimed at particular parties, groups, or
points of view, but appl[ied] equally to all partisan activities . . . . They discriminat[ed]
against no racial, ethnic, or religious minorities. Nor [did] they seek to control political
opinions or beliefs, or to interfere with or influence anyone's vote at the polls." Id.
82 Id. at 556. Justice Douglas wrote a strong dissent, reasoning that § 9(a) was written
far too broadly and would have a "chilling effect" on the first amendment rights of federal
employees. Id. at 596-98 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
" 413 U.S. at 616-18; see OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 74, § 818 (West 1976). The Oklahoma
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been directed at private individuals it would have been violative of
the first amendment, it interpreted the statute "to regulate political
activity in an even-handed and neutral manner."84 Following the
rationale of Letter Carriers, the Court held that the statute could
validly prohibit the state employees from "becoming . . . candi-
dates for any paid public office." 5
In all three of these cases, the Court was determining the con-
stitutionality of statutes that dated back to the 19th century and
were passed to limit the injection of partisan politics into the system
of civil service." As less drastic means of preserving an impartial
civil service system based on meritorious performance proved inef-
fective, the extent of the limitations placed on political activity
statute prohibited classified service employees from soliciting or receiving contributions for
political organizations or candidates. In addition, the statute provided:
No employee in the classified service shall be a member of any. . . committee
of a political party, or. . . of a partisan political club, or a candidate. . . to any
paid public office, or shall take part in the management or affairs of any political
party or in any political campaign, except to exercise his right as a citizen privately
to express his opinion and to cast his vote.
Id.
413 U.S. at 616.
Id. at 616-17. Every state has a Hatch Act similar to the federal statute. Id. at 604
n.2; see, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 36, ch. 26 § 38 (1975); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 110.092(4) (West 1973
& Supp. 1978); HAW. REV. STAT. tit. 7, § 76-91 (1976); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 11:17-2 (West 1976);
N.Y. Civ. SERV. LAW § 107 (McKinney 1973); OR. REV. STAT. § 260.432 (1977); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 71, § 741.904 (Purdon 1962 & Supp. 1978-1979); W. VA. CODE § 29-6-19 (1976). When
courts have found such statutes to be unconstitutional, they have done so on the basis of the
overbreadth doctrine. See, e.g., Hobbs v. Thompson, 448 F.2d 456 (5th Cir. 1971); Gray v.
City of Toledo, 323 F. Supp. 1281 (N.D. Ohio 1971); Bagley v. Washington Township Hosp.
Dist., 65 Cal. 2d 499, 421 P.2d 409, 55 Cal. Rptr. 401 (1966); Fort v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 61
Cal. 2d 331, 392 P.2d 385, 38 Cal. Rptr. 625 (1964). In such cases, courts usually emphasize
that the governmental interests are valid and that carefully drawn statutes would be upheld.
For example, in Gray v. City of Toledo, 323 F. Supp. 1281 (N.D. Ohio 1971), police depart-
ment regulations prohibited promoting the candidacy of others, circulating petitions for
candidates, serving on political committees, soliciting votes, speaking at political meetings
and engaging in political discussions either while on duty or in the station house. Id. at 1287.
The court held that the government interest in maintaining the integrity and efficiency of
its public service "is of such a calibre that it may properly be classified as a compelling
governmental interest," and this is "sufficient to justify an encroachment upon an individ-
ual's first amendment rights." Id. at 1285. The court stressed, however, that the restrictions
must be "directly related to the goal of prohibiting partisan political activity." Id. The
court specifically stated that the "relinquishment" of the right of candidacy may constitu-
tionally be made a condition of employment in the state civil service, but that this govern-
mental restriction of constitutional rights must not "unduly infringe upon protected rights."
Id.; accord, Bagley v. Washington Township Host. Dist., 65 Cal. 2d 499, 421 P.2d 409, 55 Cal.
Rptr. 401 (1966). The Gray court held that a city could not restrict the freedom of expression
of its public employees on political subjects or candidates where "such activity [was] not
directed towards party success." 323 F. Supp. at 1289 (citation omitted).
m See United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S.
548, 558-59 (1973).
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grew." Yet, as the Letter Carriers Court observed, the modem-day
Hatch Act only forbids political activity that is considered to be
inimical to the efficient operation of the federal service.8 As a result,
the restrictions placed on political activity are viewed to promote
"impartial execution of the laws" and protect against the develop-
ment of a corrupt political machine composed of government per-
sonnel.89 Significantly, the Act is also intended to preserve the rights
of civil servants and protect them from coercion by their superiors2 °
Except for the need to maintain impartiality in the judicial
system, the concerns to which the Hatch Act is directed are absent
in the Louisiana resign-to-run rule. The statute and canon were not
enacted in response to a history of abuses committed by Louisiana
judges seeking election to nonjudicial positions or returning to office
after defeat. If there was a generalized fear that such improprieties
did occur, less intrusive means of preventing these wrongs were not
attempted. Moreover, it seems obvious that Louisiana neither
feared the creation of a corrupt political machine consisting of
judges nor sought to protect judges from outside coercion. Since the
only significant governmental interest to be fulfilled by the resigna-
tion requirement was impartiality, the Hatch Act cases do not seem
too helpful in the assessment of the constitutionality of resign-to-
run statutes.
While resign-to-run statutes may be valid restrictions on the
rights of judges in some instances, their constitutionality should not
be assessed without reference to the vagaries of judicial selection
and political life in each state. If it can be shown that there has been
a history of abuse of judicial office during or after nonjudicial cam-
paigns, then there would be sufficient justification for a resign-to-
run rule. Absent a background of political abuse, however, the sig-
nificant intrusion of a broad resign-to-run rule upon the right to run
for political office would appear unconstitutional.
'7 See id. at 559-60.
See id. at 565.
" See id.
" As noted by the Letter Carriers Court, a major reason for enacting the Hatch Act was
"to make sure that Government employees would be free from pressure and from express or
tacit invitation to vote in a certain way or perform political chores in order to curry favor
with their superiors rather than to act out their own beliefs." Id. at 566 (citations omitted).
The Court reflected that Congress might at some later date discard this belief but this was
"its current view . . . and [the Court was not] now in any position to dispute it. Nor, in
[its] view, does the Constitution forbid it." Id. at 567.
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CONCLUSION
Resign-to-run statutes seek to remove the judiciary from parti-
san politics and thereby prevent actual impropriety as well as the
appearance of impropriety. This is a desirable goal and the Morial
court has provided a sound constitutional framework with which to
analyze such statutes. The facts and circumstances behind each
state's resign-to-run statute, however, should be examined more
closely than was done in Morial before the statute is found constitu-
tional under the reasonable necessity standard.
Neil M. Horwitz
